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AbstrAct
background Corporations use a range of strategies to 
dispute their role in causing public health harms and to 
limit the scope of effective public health interventions. 
This is well documented in relation to the activities of the 
tobacco industry, but research on other industries is less 
well developed. We therefore analysed public statements 
and documents from four unhealthy commodity 
industries to investigate whether and how they used 
arguments about complexity in this way.
Methods We analysed alcohol, food, soda and 
gambling industry documents and websites and minutes 
of reports of relevant health select committees, using 
standard document analysis methods.
results Two main framings were identified: (i) these 
industries argue that aetiology is complex, so individual 
products cannot be blamed; and (ii) they argue that 
population health measures are ’too simple’ to address 
complex public health problems. However, in this second 
framing, there are inherent contradictions in how 
industry used ’complexity’, as their alternative solutions 
are generally not, in themselves, complex.
conclusion The concept of complexity, as commonly 
used in public health, is also widely employed by 
unhealthy commodity industries to influence how the 
public and policymakers understand health issues. It is 
frequently used in response to policy announcements 
and in response to new scientific evidence (particularly 
evidence on obesity and alcohol harms). The 
arguments and language may reflect the existence of 
a cross-industry ’playbook’ , whose use results in the 
undermining of effective public health policies – in 
particular the undermining of effective regulation of 
profitable industry activities that are harmful to the 
public’s health.
IntroductIon
Unhealthy commodity industries (UCIs) are 
responsible for producing and promoting the 
unhealthy consumption of products, which play 
a major role in driving the growing burden of 
non-communicable diseases.1 The strategies 
that such industries use to defend their practices 
are increasingly the subject of research.1–3 There 
is growing evidence that these activities, on the 
part of the tobacco and alcohol industry at any 
rate, have involved the misuse and misrepresen-
tation of the scientific process and the evidence 
base, sometimes through the adoption of ‘pseu-
do-scientific’ processes and language.4 5 Drawing 
on apparently scientific concepts and methods 
in this way has the goal of changing how policy 
issues are understood and debated. It also tends 
to manufacture uncertainty and undermine scien-
tific consensus, thereby curtailing the potential 
for effective public health policy responses.1 Such 
discourses can exert an impact on the real world of 
policymaking. For example, the tobacco industry 
fostered the use of the concepts of psychological 
stress as an alternative explanation for coronary 
heart disease (CHD), sponsoring researchers and 
conferences and using the concepts in litigation to 
argue that these acted as unmeasured confounders 
in the relationship between smoking and disease.6 7 
Other UCIs pursue similar tactics.8–13 However, 
comparisons of discourses across UCIs remain 
uncommon.
One candidate for further analysis is complexity. 
Complexity science is increasingly important in 
public health,14–17 stimulated by a recognition that 
many public health problems arise in unpredictable 
ways from the interactions between individuals and 
their environments.14 18 19 For example, obesity is 
subject to influences ranging from the individual 
level (such as individual choices and energy needs) 
to the system level (eg, advertising, pricing, agricul-
tural policies). In recognition of this, frameworks 
such as the Foresight model have been developed to 
illustrate this complexity and to identify interven-
tion points.20 Other major public health challenges 
have also been subject to complexity analysis, 
including tobacco control18 and alcohol consump-
tion and harms14 21 22 in order to show how the 
problems emerge from highly interconnected 
systems.19 23
In parallel, it is possible that UCIs may be using 
the concept of complexity to quite different ends: 
to dispute the role of unhealthy commodities in 
the causation of health problems and to prevent 
the adoption of evidence-based interventions, 
particularly those that regulate the environment 
in which the industry acts. While there has been a 
wealth of research on the activities of the tobacco 
industry, other key commercial actors that influ-
ence the disease burden—notably, alcohol, food 
and sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) industries—
are believed to be pursuing similar strategies.24 
Research on these industries has recently expanded 
to include gambling, but it remains under-re-
searched.25 Gambling bears similarities to alcohol 
and tobacco; for example, there are no safe levels 
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of alcohol and tobacco use, and it has been argued that there are 
no safe levels of gambling.26
We aimed to investigate how four UCIs (alcohol, food, SSBs 
and gambling) have used the concept of complexity. By making 
systematic comparisons across these industries, we seek to under-
stand whether they pursue common tactics and the implications 
of this for research, practice and policy (see box 1).12 27
Methods
We used established document analysis approaches, informed by 
the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis.28 29 Through a focus 
on the use of language, this approach allows power relations 
(including the exertion of policy influence) to be made visible. 
We first identified documents, interviews, presentations or state-
ments in which four industries (the alcohol industry, the SSB 
industry, the food industry and the gambling industry) presented 
the scientific idea of ‘complexity’. We assessed how the concept 
was presented, what the explicit argument being made was and 
whether there were inherent contradictions within the data. 
This involved a general thematic analysis to identify themes and 
subthemes.30
We identified examples from searching industry websites (the 
International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD) and the 
International Center for Alcohol Policies (ICAP) and its publi-
cations; the Responsible Gambling Trust (RGT; rebranded as 
GambleAware in 2016); the Portman Group; Drinkaware; the 
UK Food and Drink Federation; the American Beverage Associa-
tion), trade press (The Grocer and  Just- Drinks. com) and reports 
of Health Select Committees. We included examples in which 
industry representatives refer to complexity; other examples 
from these industries are given in online supplementary file 1. 
The findings are then placed in a wider framework, to high-
light how other industries have historically used the concept of 
complexity, and to identify general approaches.
results
We identified two main themes in these documents:
1. the impossible complexity of public health problems
A recurrent theme within publicly available industry sources 
is the presentation of the drivers of public health issues as 
‘complex’, often implying that the issue is influenced by a multi-
tude of interconnected factors, many of which are outside of 
the control of policymakers and industry. Instead, the emphasis 
is usually placed on the responsibility of the individual. The 
industry in question generally does not include itself among the 
causal factors, but instead it often stresses the need to deal with 
the complexity via a multistakeholder, collaborative partnership 
approach. For example, the Portman Group, the UK alcohol 
industry’s corporate social responsibility body, appears to use 
complexity arguments to reject calls for alcohol labelling to be 
improved.31 Moreover, the alcohol industry frequently points 
to the many complex influences on young people’s drinking, 
in order to rebut arguments about the role of advertising and 
pricing, as in this example:
“Young people’s drinking is influenced by a complex number of 
interacting factors including family, peers, media, cultural norms 
and government policies. Therefore, a complex range of solutions 
and the involvement of different stakeholders are needed to reduce 
the potential risk for harm.”.32 32
The World Spirits Alliance goes further, arguing in a submis-
sion to a WHO public hearing in 2009 on the WHO Global 
Strategy on Alcohol, that the complexity of the issue means that 
current evidence-based solutions are ineffective:
“The reasons for alcohol misuse are complex, yet solutions are often 
simplistic, based around increased regulation… New solutions need 
to be found therefore. These must be multi-faceted and culturally 
sensitive. They should not be so wide as to try and reach the entire 
population… No one size fits all solution for tackling misuse of 
alcohol exists. There are wide cultural differences across, and even 
within, regions.”33
Twenty of the 37 submissions from international spirits, wine 
and beer producers to the WHO Global Strategy on Alcohol 
referred to the complexity of the problem, and 25 argued against 
‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions. The two concepts often appeared 
together, as in the following statement by the Brewers Associa-
tion of Australia and New Zealand Inc. (2009):
“Alcohol misuse is not a problem of simple, linear cause and effect 
relationships. Instead, a raft of complex and interacting factors 
underlie a society’s attitudes and actions towards alcohol use, 
dramatically reducing the likely effectiveness of any intervention 
taken in isolation. Therefore, it is essential that the background and 
diversity of societal and cultural settings be fully considered in any 
strategy”.33
This quote also illustrates another aspect of complexity that is 
very often highlighted in these submissions and elsewhere as a 
reason why they claim that policies are likely to be ineffective: 
variations in cultural contexts.
An underpinning aspect of the use of complexity by these 
industries is the distancing of their role in contributing to the 
policy issue at hand. Such a framing may be chosen because it is 
of value in litigation. For example, McDonalds has successfully 
used arguments about the multifactorial causation of obesity to 
defend itself against a class action taken against it by two New 
York teenagers who argued that the company was liable for 
their obesity (Pelman vs McDonalds Corp, 2002).34 McDonalds 
argued successfully that obesity is complex and multifactorial35 
and that the plaintiffs needed to show that other possible causes 
of their obesity (ie, other than a McDonalds diet) were ruled 
out.36 They argued:
“The plaintiffs’… physical conditions are inherently the result of 
a combination of so many factors and influences that attempting 
to attribute proximate cause to the consumption of certain of the 
products served at McDonald’s is impossible as a matter of law.”37
See also online supplementary file 1.
2. rejecting evidence-based policies: ‘no simple solutions, no 
single ingredient’
Having argued for complexity in causation, industries then 
appear to use this as a platform from which to argue that simple 
solutions (often referring to regulation) would be ineffective. 
The international alcohol industry has long made extensive use 
of such arguments to confuse and create doubt about evidence on 
the causes of alcohol harms, while presenting alternative, 
usually ineffective, solutions. For example, the industry-funded 
body ICAP in its book ‘Drinking in Context’ (2007) argues 
that alcohol is such a complex behaviour that it is difficult to 
prove that interventions (typically, policies) really work.38 More 
recently, IARD’s message is that alcohol consumption is subject 
to so many cultural and contextual influences, that cause–effect 
relationships cannot be established and that interventions there-
fore cannot truly be ‘known’ to be effective.
The food industry uses very similar arguments, often claiming 
that because of the complexity of causation, it is impossible to 
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single out one ingredient or product as a cause; such thinking is 
then describe as simplistic. For example, the director general of 
the Food and Drink Federation, the representative body for the 
UK food and drink manufacturing industry, in a 2015 letter to 
the head of the National Health Service in England, makes the 
case why sugar should not be blamed for obesity:
“We believe obesity is a complex problem which cannot be reduced 
to the demonization of one ingredient… there is no simple answer 
to the complex problems of obesity” (Food and Drink Federation 
(third June 2015)).39
SSB industry arguments, too, frequently contrast a ‘complex 
problem’ (obesity) with ‘simplistic approaches’ or ‘single solu-
tions’ (typically, taxation of SSBs), as in this example:
“There’s ample evidence to suggest that taxing soft drinks won’t 
curb obesity, not least because its causes are far more complex 
than this simplistic approach implies… Trying to blame one set of 
products is misguided…” (British Soft Drinks Association (BDSA)40)
The gambling industry responds to challenges about its 
responsibility for harms in a similar way, rejecting industry-re-
lated causes of problem gambling, such as advertising or problem 
products.41 Typical examples include the industry’s endorsement 
of research funded by the RGT (now GambleAware), a charity 
funded by voluntary donations from the gambling industry. The 
research in question did not provide evidence deemed capable of 
supporting any changes to policy, including reductions in stakes 
or prizes:
“Ladbrokes [UK-based betting company] welcomes this world-
leading study which illustrates that gambling related harm is 
complex and that simplistic approaches are not effective.”42
The idea that problematic gambling behaviour is complex 
and that existing research does not provide sufficient grounds 
for interventions is very widely employed and influential in 
the industry.43 44 It often appears to to identify the individual, 
rather than any products or activities, as the source of problem 
gambling. For example:
Problem gambling is complex and is about the person not the 
specific product. Gala Coral, and the bookmaking sector as a whole, 
is determined to play a leadership role in identifying appropriate 
measures that improve player protection for those who need it 
while, as far as possible, protecting the freedom of the millions 
who enjoy betting responsibly.45
The complexity argument is also used to reject changes to the 
structural characteristics of products such as Fixed Odds Betting 
Terminals, which are associated with high rates of problem 
gambling. This is seen in the Association of British Bookmaker’s 
(ABB) response to research by the Gambling Commission, which 
they suggested indicated that there was no relationship between 
gaming machines in bookmakers and problem gambling:
This is yet another piece of evidence that shows problem gambling 
is complex and that focusing on stake or a single class of venue is 
the wrong approach.46
3. tensions in the industry use of ‘complexity’
Despite the claim that the complexity of the problem prevents 
simple solutions, the solutions most commonly proposed by 
industries do not themselves appear any more or less complex 
than those they reject—such as the industry emphasis on 
recommending more information, education and individual 
responsibility. In one example, Tennents’ in 2005 (then owned 
by brewers InBev, now under different ownership) responded 
to the problem of alcohol and homelessness by arguing that 
individuals need to take responsibility for their consumption 
patterns and by stating their preference for addressing the 
complexity through ‘partnership’ (see online supplementary 
file 1).47
Similarly, the Portman Group in a response to a European 
Union consultation warns of the complexity of alcohol harms.31 
Their submission also states that ‘health warning labels are an 
ineffective strategy to minimise alcohol-related harm, particu-
larly in the ‘at-risk’ groups’—while elsewhere the same docu-
ment points to the importance of labelling and providing simple 
responsibility messages (eg, ‘Please enjoy responsibly’).31
BDSA, too, argues that obesity is a complex issue, with many 
contributory factors, including physical activity, diet and life-
style, which must all be taken into account. However, the solu-
tion is simple: ‘Providing people with a choice of beverages helps 
ensure they drink enough—variety of drinks choice is key’.48
As with SSBs, arguments about complexity are often combined 
with a recommendation for educational approaches, as in this 
statement from McDonald’s chief executive officer (CEO), 
talking about childhood obesity:
“The issue of obesity is complex and is absolutely one our society 
is facing, there’s no denial about that…  But if you break it down I 
think there’s an education piece: how can we better communicate 
to individuals the importance of a balanced diet and taking care 
of themselves?” (Steve Easterbrook, McDonalds CEO, 8 January 
2008).49
The gambling industry also appears to favour simple solutions 
to the complex issue of problem gambling. ABB, for example, 
describes its approach to minimising gambling-related harm as 
based on ‘effective education and prevention techniques, designed 
to prevent people getting to a stage where they have a problem 
with their gambling.’50 However, international evidence suggests 
that structural changes, such as precommitment, one-dollar 
maximum bets or other machine design changes, may yield 
significantly more effective harm minimisation effects than 
measures focused on the individual and designed to encourage 
‘responsible gambling.’51
We also noted that complexity arguments often appear along-
side statements that de-emphasised the problem, by stating that 
it is in decline. Thus, the argument against the implementation 
of effective population-level measures appears to be constructed 
from at least five frequently recurring elements, which are 
commonly used across industries and across countries (box 1).
dIscussIon
The concept of complexity in causation is used in very similar 
ways by a range of UCIs to dispute their role in causing the 
problems and to argue against regulatory or legislative solutions. 
Used in this way, complexity represents an industry ‘frame’, used 
to influence public perceptions and political debate.52 Under-
standing such frames can be an important part of analysing 
policy debate and developing and implementing effective 
policy. Framing has been widely used by the tobacco industry 
to influence discussions about tobacco and the necessity for 
regulation.52 53 This analysis shows that industry framing aims 
to influence a range of other policy debates, too; in the case 
of the alcohol industry, the focus is on minimum unit pricing 
of alcohol and marketing restrictions; for the SSB industry, the 
focus is typically on sugar tax; for the food industry, the focus 
is on policy solutions such as ‘fat taxes’ or sugar taxes; and for 
the gambling industry, it is on the tighter regulation of harmful 
industry products.44
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What is already known on this subject
Historically, unhealthy commodity industries have sought to 
manipulate the public and scientific understanding of public 
health problems. The history of the tobacco industry in this 
regard is well known, but there are also more recent examples 
of attempts by industry to influence the agenda. For example, 
the sugar and fast food industries frequently dispute the 
evidence that diet is a contributor to obesity, instead seeking to 
portray obesity as primarily a problem of ‘energy imbalance’—
thus distracting from their own role in causing the problem. 
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The examples given are illustrative, and many more could be 
given. Overall, the framing of the problem appears intended to 
suggest that, because of problem complexity, we need, but do 
not have, perfect evidence on how to solve the problem, while 
current ‘simplistic’ solutions (typically, public health policies) are 
unacceptable. There are variations between the industries exam-
ined, and in particular, the examples from the alcohol industry 
appear more detailed and developed than for other industries 
and emerge from a wider range of responsibility organisations. 
This may reflect their longer history of disseminating such infor-
mation, for example, through organisations such as ICAP.54 It 
may also reflect links both to the tobacco industry and to think-
tanks linked to the tobacco and alcohol industries.
Arguments about the complex, multifactorial aetiology of 
CHD and cancer have long been used by the tobacco industry to 
dispute the epidemiological and other evidence.7 This approach to 
the evidence has also been documented in other industries,52 55 56 
and the use of double standards in demands for evidence is a 
characteristic of many other fields.9 For example, car manufac-
turers fought the mandatory introduction of airbags and seat-
belts in the 1960s as ineffective,57 and the alcohol industry and 
motoring organisations did the same with the introduction of the 
breathalyser to tackle drink driving in the 1960s.58 Demands for 
perfect evidence, while misrepresenting the existing evidence, 
can also be observed in climate change denialism.9
the logical fallacies underlying industry arguments
There are numerous inconsistencies and fallacies underpinning 
the arguments presented by UCIs. One fallacy is that, because 
the aetiology of a particular problem is complex, we cannot be 
sure that one aspect, for example, alcohol, is causally implicated. 
A related fallacy is that perfect evidence is needed to establish 
any risk factor. Yet all health and social problems have complex 
causes, at least in the way that industries use the term. For 
example, lung cancer is a disease with a complex aetiology, but 
smoking is its most important risk factor: and most cases of lung 
cancer occur in smokers.59 Yet there is no ‘perfect’ evidence of 
lung cancer and smoking: there are no randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs), for obvious reasons. Even if there were, the 
evidence would still not be ‘perfect’ because such hypothetical 
RCTs would not include all current and future smokers, from all 
possible contexts.
The industry arguments presented in this paper imply the exis-
tence of what can perhaps be termed the ‘complexity fallacy’: that 
complex problems can only be addressed by complex solutions. 
Policymakers should be aware of this so that it may be taken 
into account when weighing industry arguments that ‘Nothing 
can be done until everything is done’. However, complexity in 
itself is not an argument against being able to identify signifi-
cant contributing factors to a particular problem and to start 
addressing these. For example, smoking is a complex public 
health problem, with many interconnecting social, cultural and 
economic influences; yet, multifactorial causation does not 
preclude identifying and tackling one part of the problem, such 
as marketing.
conclusIons
The use of the concept of complexity to counter effective inter-
ventions appears to be part of a cross-industry ‘playbook’, given 
the similar way it is deployed and the very similar language used. 
These similarities between industries are not surprising given the 
revolving doors between industry bodies and the interlocking 
directorates.60 61
The use of complexity is likely to be part of a wider strategy by 
industry bodies to promote a parallel evidence base, and thereby 
to influence policy and to weaken purely public-health based 
policies.52 Our analysis highlights the importance of compara-
tive cross-industry analyses in understanding this playbook. With 
further data, it may be possible to identify particular arguments 
and combinations of arguments, put forward by different propo-
nents, for example, industry-funded researchers, politicians or 
think-tanks, which may be particularly characteristic of industry 
involvement. The combination of phrases relating to ‘complex 
problem/simplistic solutions/one-size-fits-all solutions’ appears 
to be one of these.
Finally, it should be noted that public health problems are 
genuinely complex, and discussion of their complexity is of 
course essential for the genuine exploration of problems and 
solutions. However, for public health proponents, complexity 
provides a framework to help develop a sophisticated under-
standing of the problem and to determine how to intervene at 
different levels and across different outcomes.62 63 In contrast, 
industries often use the term loosely, corresponding to defini-
tions of ‘complicatedness,’ rather than ‘complexity’.63 More 
importantly, ‘complexity’ seems not to be used as a starting 
point for further analysis or for effective intervention but appar-
ently to distract the audience from the industry’s contribution 
to the problem and to promote inaction or ineffective solutions. 
Overall, the industry framing of complexity seems consistent 
with a warning by Roberts and Edwards:
box 1 the unhealthy commodity Industry playbook on 
‘complexity’
Arguments about the nature of the problem:
1. The problem affects a minority of the population and/or is 
declining; 
2. The aetiology is complex, so we cannot blame a single 
product or product category; (keywords/phrases: 
‘demonisation’; ‘no single solution’; ‘no one size fits all’); 
3. Consumption or use of the product makes only a small 
contribution to public health harms.
the preferred solutions of unhealthy commodity 
industries:
1. Arguments that taxation and other population-level 
measures are too simple a solution to such a complex 
problem; (key phrases: ‘no one-size fits all’; ‘no magic 
bullets’), and 
2. Claims that information, education and personal 
responsibility are the appropriate and/or most effective 
solutions.
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What this study adds
This study shows how the concept of ‘complexity’ is used in this 
way by a range of industries—including the gambling, alcohol 
and food industries. Complexity therefore appears to be an 
important aspect of a cross-industry ‘playbook’. Researchers and 
policymakers should be aware of this, as use of this playbook 
tends to undermine effective action—in particular, to undermine 
effective regulation of those industry activities that are harmful 
to the public’s health.
research report
Complexity is a strategy used by professional elites to maintain 
control. Proclaiming that a problem is complex, is shorthand for 
saying that you have no role in solving it.64
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